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THE PLEADING AND PRE-TRIAL OF AN
ANTITRUST CLAIM*
Fred A. Freundt
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by affording each party a most
comprehensive opportunity to prepare for trial, seem to discourage trials.
In the antitrust field, because pre-trial preparations may be monumental,
only patient and affluent parties, the United States included, are likely
to take the full journey through pre-trial, to say nothing of trial and
appeal. In recent years, the number of civil antitrust cases which reached
judgment during or after trial has averaged only 26 per year.' In con-
trast, the comparable figure for like cases disposed of during the pre-
trial phase by settlement or motion is 211 per year While antitrust
trials may be relatively infrequent, the amount of pre-trial activity in
antitrust suits is disproportionately large,3 not only because of the
customary complexity of fact and economic issues, but also because of
the frequent joinder of numerous parties. The abundance of pre-trial
activity derives from a basic recognition that, whether or not the case is
eventually tried, knowing and skillful application of pre-trial procedures
can do much to shape its disposition.
Diversity of facts and dissimilarity of exposures prevent any single
pre-trial technique or formula from universally serving the varying
needs of antitrust actions. Instead, a sound objective is the wasteless
application of the knowledge of pre-trial procedure to the needs of the
given litigation, thereby minimizing time-consuming and unrewarding
steps. In this light, the focus here shall be upon several of the procedural
facets with which antitrust counsel in civil litigation are typically con-
cerned.
I. PLEADING
Determination of the content of the "claim for relief" is an initial
step in most every suit. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require:
* This article is based on a speech delivered by the author before the section of Anti-
trust Law of the American Bar Association.
t See contributor's section, masthead p. 579, for biographical data.
1 The author is indebted to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for
supplying the statistics referred to in this paragraph and the footnotes thereto. The average
was computed on the basis of figures for the five fiscal years ending June 30, 1960.
2 Likewise, this average was computed on the basis of figures for the five fiscal years
ending June 30, 1960. Consent judgments and consent dismissals account for about 861 of
such dispositions.
3 As of June 30, 1960, there were 688 civil antitrust cases pending in the United States
District Courts. About two-thirds of these were in the District Courts of New York, Penn-
sylvania, California, Missouri, Illinois and Massachusetts. In the five fiscal years ending
June 30, 1960, an average of some 270 civil antitrust cases were commenced per year. This
is to be compared with 61,795 cases per year, the average number of federal civil cases
of all kinds commenced in the same period. 1956-1960 Annual Reports of the Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Table C 1.
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A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . .. shall contain (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdic-
tion depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs
no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. .... 4
As applicable to antitrust, it- is perhaps surprising that the meaning of
these requirements, in effect since 1938 has engendered spirited debate
among the judiciary in recent years.5
It is generally accepted that antitrust suits tend to be protracted,6
that in order to accelerate their progress control of discovery is vital, and
to that end early definition of the issues is needed. 7 For the avowed pur-
pose of facilitating the issue identification process, some district judges
required "special" antitrust pleadings of a kind containing allegations of
greater factual detail than needed merely to satisfy the so-called "notice"
function of pleading.8 This approach, however, has been rejected in some
Courts of Appeal.' The opponents of "special" antitrust pleadings have
questioned whether the more elaborate factual detail helps to define the
issues or just adds volume. They asserted that the Federal Rules con-
template only a kind of notice pleading that identifies the issues broadly,
without describing the specific instances, which are left for discovery to
unveil.
In this connection, the Second Circuit has stressed its preference for
a "lean and terse allegation in sequence of events as they have hap-
pened . . .,,'9 and the Tenth Circuit speaks of a concise, "generalized
statement of the facts. . ... 11 But the Federal Rules governing pleading
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
5 See notes 8 and 9, infra.
6 See, e.g., Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted 'Cases 25
(Jud. Conf. U.S. 1960), reprinted in 25 F.R.D. 351, 375 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Hand-
book].
7 Handbook, 35-8, 25 F.R.D_ 386-389 (1960).
8 See, e.g., Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37, 40 (W.D. La. 1957); Bairn & Blank
v. Admiral Corp., 132 F. Supp. 412, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Hershel Cal. Fruit Prods. Co.
v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 603, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Bader v. Zurich Gen. Acc. &
Liab. Ins. Co., 12 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See also Dawson, The Place of the Pleading
in a Proper Definition of the Issues in the "Big Case," 23 F.R.D. 430, 434 (1959). But see
Brownlee v. Malco Theaters Inc., 99 F. Supp. 312, 313-14 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
9 Niagara of Buffalo, Inc. v. Niagara Mfg. & Distrib. Corp., 262 F.2d 106, 107 (2d Cir.
1958); Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 257 F.2d 417, 418 (7th Cir.
1958); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 324-26 (2d Cir. 1957); New Home Appliance
Center Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1957). See also Fred Johnson Cement
Block Co. v. Waylite Co., 182 F. Supp. 914, 917 (D. Minn. 1960); Encore Stores, Inc. v.
May Dep't Stores Co., 164 F. Supp. 82, 83-84 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Professional & Businessmen's
L. I. Co. v. Bankers Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274, 283-84 (D. Mont. 1958). See also Clark,
Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45 (1958); Clark, Comment on judge
Dawson's Paper on the Place of the Pleading in a Proper Definition of the Issues in the
"Big Case," 23 F.R.D. 435 (1959). The Second Circuit also applies its "liberal rules" to
antitrust indictments. United States v. Bitz, 282 F.2d 465- (2d Cir. 1960).
10 Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 325 (2d Cir. 19 7).
11 New Home Appliance Center Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1957).
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never use the word "fact,' 1 2 and the Complaint Forms to the Rules'8
evidence a mixture of allegations of ultimate facts and conclusions of
law. Thus, a happier compromise would seem to be a brief, but informa-
tive, statement of events or facts, plus the addition of some conclusions
interspersed to mark the legal theory upon which the claimant relies.
Not only would this aid the "issue" development, but it would avoid the
unwanted "allegation of details."' 4
It is not easy to cull from the semantics5 an operative standard that
tells the draftsman of a claim just how much he should say." On the one
hand, a judge may strike a badly prolix and unclear complaint,17 but
motions to strike are not generally encouraged, and usually a court will
not prune a pleading unless it contains immaterial matter that prejudices
the answering party.' On the other hand, a sketchy complaint invites
action by judges who, knowing the burdens imposed on those defending
12 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8-10, 12-13. In upholding the Sherman Act complaint in United
States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 188 (1954), the Supreme Court did not
find it necessary to distinguish between whether charges were "allegations of fact" or "mere
conclusions of the pleader." In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), an action under
the Railway Labor Act, the Court stated:
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail
the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is a
'short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 84; see, e.g., Appendix of Forms 5, 8, 9, 11, 16.
14 Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1957).
15 Some circuits even differ as to the relationship, if any, between the term "claim" as
used in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 54(b), and the traditional "cause of action." Compare
Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 220 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1955), 232 F.2d 190, 193
n. 3 (9th Cir. 1956) with United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Prods. Inc., 221 F.2d 213,
215-16 (2d Cir. 1955). But see the pending amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), 29 U.S.L.
Week 3308-09 (April 18, 1961).
16 However, the path of a plaintiff through the mountains of anti-trust pleadings is a
treacherous one. If the plaintiff is lengthy, he is being redundant, vague or evidential;
if he is or attempts to be concise, he has no case or is pleading conclusions only. ....
Hathaway Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 21 Fed. Rules Serv. 8a. 464, Case 2 (D.
Conn. March 1, 1955).
17 See, e.g., Hershel Cal. Fruit Prods. Co. v. Hunt Foods, 16 F.R.D. 547 (NJ). Cal. 1954);
Metropolitan Theater Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc., 12 F.RD. 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
("The instant [55 page] complaint is a gross violation of Rule 8. It will, therefore, be
stricken, with leave to plaintiff to file an amended pleading which contains simple, concise
and distinct averments, and conforms to Rule 8. The amended complaint should avoid
characterizations, lectures, dissertations, unnecessary evidence and flights of literary fancy,
all of which permeate the complaint as it now stands.") Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) requires that:
"Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct . . " and Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10(b) requires: "All averments of claim or defense shall be made in numbered
paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to a
statement of a single set of circumstances; . . . Each claim founded upon a separate
transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a
separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of
the matters set forth."
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). See Independent Theaters Inc. v. American Broadcasting-
Paramount Theaters, Inc.,-2 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 12 f. 21, Case 2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1959);
Fleischer v. A. A. P., Inc., 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 12 f. 21, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1959);
Rosen v. Texas Co., 161 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Gasswint v. Clapper, 17 F.R.D.
309, 315 (W.D. Mo. 1955); Hershel Cal. Fruit Prods. Co. v. Hunt Foods, 119 F. Supp. 603,
607 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
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an antitrust claim, quite properly strive to weed out the frivolous suits
before the harm is done. For Sherman Act, Section 1, cases, it is too
often judicially stated to be ignored that a general allegation of con-
spiracy to restrain trade without a statement of the facts constituting the
conspiracy, its object and accomplishment, is but an allegation of a legal
conclusion insufficient to constitute a cause of action." However, after
accounting for amendments to pleadings and appeals, it is a signal feat
for a party to enjoy permanently the fruits of a dismissal for failure to
state a claim.20
Judges occasionally advise that "the profession would do well to
accept the fact that little can be accomplished by motions on the plead-
ings.")21 The Judicial Conference has apparently recognized that courts
have not insisted that pleadings be the vehicle for framing issues in the
protracted case. Accordingly, the Conference recommended that counsel
be directed, early in the pre-trial proceedings, to submit statements
elaborating and clarifying the positions taken in the pleadings.2"
Undoubtedly, general and undetailed pleading is motivated by a desire
to retain maximum flexibility-at least until discovery clarifies and ex-
poses the factual contours. However, it is questionable whether this
transitory benefit is worth the risk of burdensome intervening motions
19 See, e.g., Crummer Co. v. DuPont, 223 F.2d 238, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 848 (1955); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 913-14
(5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); Black & Yates Inc. v. Mahogany Ass'n
Inc., 129 F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 672 (1942). See also Fedderson
Motors v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1950); Bairn & Blank Inc. v. Admiral Corp.,
132 F. Supp. 412, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. North Coast Transp. Co., 7 F.R.D.
491 (W.D. Wash. 1947). But see Sandidge v. Rogers, 256 F.2d 269, 275-77 (7th Cir. 1958);
Louisiana Farmers Protective Union Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 131 F.2d 419, 422
(8th Cir. 1942).
20 For example, in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, the district court dis-
missed, successively, the complaint, 1957 Trade Cases II 68,909 (N.D. Ill. 1957), an amended
complaint, 1958 Trade Cases ff 69,173 (N.D. Ill. 1958), and a second amended complaint,
1959 Trade Cases ffff 69,310, 69,311 (N.D. Ill. 1959); dismissal of the last was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, 273 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1959), and then reversed by the Supreme
Court, 364 U.S. 656 (1961), which noted, for Sherman Act, Section 1, that: "allegations
adequate to show a violation and, in a private treble damage action, that plaintiff was
damaged thereby are all the law requires." Id. at 660. In McElhenny Co. v. Western Auto
Supply Co., 1960 Trade Cases ff 69,850 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 29 U.S.L. Week 3261
(U.S. March 7, 1961), the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari after the Fourth Circuit,
reversing the District Court, sustained the seconded amended treble damage complaint
which followed the Circuit Court's dismissal of the first such amended complaint, 269 F.2d
332 (4th Cir. 1959). See also Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.
1955). On the other hand, notwithstanding a liberal attitude toward antitrust pleadings
which finds some reflection in Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453
(1957), the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hohensee v. Akron Beacon Journal Publish-
ing Co., 277 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 29 U.S.L. Week 3165 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1960),
which had upheld the lower court's dismissal of a treble damage complaint and its refusal to
allow a proffered amended complaint to be filed. See also Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 214 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
21 Rosen v. Texas Co., 161 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); see also Kroch v. Texas
Co., 167 F. Supp. 947, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
22 Handbook 35-8, 25 F.R.D. 386-389 (1960).
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to the pleadings. Moreover, if supplementary statements are utilized to
focus upon the genuine issues, so as to set advance limits upon discovery,
the loose pleader may have, done little but defer his work from the plead-
ing stage to a pretrial conference shortly thereafter.
In contrast, there can be procedural advantages to the more informa-
tive statement of claim. Plaintiff must consider both that his adversary
may be entitled to the first discovery and that his interests normally lie
in expediting the proceedings. To avoid undue burdens and delays,
plaintiff should lean toward narrowing issues consistent with his own
needs for discovery from the other side. Looseness in the complaint may
give defendant the option of a broader discovery than would be relevant
to a more carefully drawn document and, with the door thus opened,
plaintiff may find that he cannot gracefully withdraw.
Not to be overlooked, therefore, is the use of the pleading as a vehicle
for exercising a firmer measure of initial control over the issues. Unam-
biguous pleadings that add flesh to bareboned allegations can frame issues
which minimize the need for further pre-trial clarification. Tactically,
while courts may neither insist upon nor even encourage artistic plead-
ing, the antitrust practitioner does well to preserve the art as the means
of persuasively reflecting, at the outset, the substance of his client's posi-
tion while at the same time shaping the issues to a preconceived mold.23
In some treble damage cases, recognition of the problems presented by
ambiguous complaints has prompted stipulations among counsel for the
deferral of answers until defendants have had some discovery from plain-
tiffs.24 This procedure has been employed where defendants have availed
themselves of the opportunity to obtain priority of discovery. 25 However,
this deferral is generally inapplicable where a plaintiff has priority and
needs to be apprised of new issues that defendant may raise in answer
so that plaintiff's initial discovery may embrace the full subject matter of
the action.
The purpose in deferring the answer is to permit defendant, having
23 Hence, on the subject of indefinite pleadings, I think our panel would pretty much
agree on this message to the judges:
First, there isn't any excuse for vague, general pleading in Government cases. As
a rule, the Department of Justice has had a great deal of discovery before a complaint
is filed, either through Grand jury subpoenas or through voluntary disclosure. Second,
where a private case is filed, based largely on a previous Government case, there is
similarly no excuse for vagueness. In both these situations the courts ought to enforce
Rule 8(a).
McLaren, Procedure in Private Antitrust Cases, 21 F.R.D. 440, 442 (1958).
24 See, e.g., Rockaway News Supply Co. v. The New York Times Co., Civil No. 61 Civ.
426 S.D.N.Y., Feb. 23, 1961; American Independent Tanker Owners Ass'n v. American Oil
Co., Civil No. 150-162, S.D.N.Y., Sept. 29, 1959; Rothman v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., Civil
No. 135-208, S.D.N.Y., Sept. 2, 1958; Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., Civil No. 110-223,
S.D.N.Y., July 10, 1956.
25 See text at notes 52-56, infra.
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priority of discovery, to use discovery to gain a clearer conception of the
allegations to which he must address his response. While this practice
has been criticized as encouraging "interminable delay in the orderly
progress of a case to trial,126 a premature answer requirement may be at
least as unsatisfactory. Doubtless, it is desirable that affirmative defenses
which may be dispositive or may narrowly limit issues should be raised
by motion, heard and decided early,2 7 but insistence upon a premature
answer does not necessarily serve these ends. Rather, it may tend to
proliferate issues and motions by forcing the statement of defenses be-
fore their value can be accurately appraised.
If pressed to an early answer, ignorance and caution lead a defendant
to deny quite freely, and to state, for fear of waiver and to protect broad
discovery, all his conceivable defenses. Since defenses need be pleaded
with no greater particularity than claims,28 a plaintiff may be prompted
to test their legal sufficiency by motion. Issues may thus be tendered,
argued and defended which discovery, had it preceded answer, would
have relegated to less consequential status. Moreover, to the extent that
pre-trial conference statements and orders substitute for the answer in
the issue joining process and in controlling discovery in the protracted
case, forcing an early answer is even more pointless.29
Consequently, courts and counsel should not overlook advantages in
delaying answers past discovery. Such a practice may encourage the
hearing of sound, well-prepared motions invoking affirmative defenses
when they are ripe for disposition. Also, factual discovery tends toward
a greater willingness to admit, by reducing fear of the unknown, and
discovery promotes a voluntary limitation to defenses that still look re-
spectable in the light of a better understanding of the case; the effect
is to narrow and define issues and to simplify trial.
II. DISCOvERY
In the field of discovery, the case law suggests a few preliminary com-
ments. The dimension of most antitrust actions necessarily imposes large
discovery burdens upon the respective parties and has stimulated fre-
quent resort to the courts. The resultant flow of precedent, coupled with
the broad discretion with which courts are invested in the discovery area,
26 Ideal Pictures, Inc. v. Films, Inc., 1961 Trade Cases, ff 69,899 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
27 See Handbook, 43 25 F.R.D. 394 (1960). By the same token, separate trial or hearing
of particular segregated issues may be a valuable tool in shortening the protracted case.
Handbook, 51-2, 25 F.R.D. at 403-4. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (c), (d); 56.
28 Lehmann Trading Corp. v. J & H Stolow Inc., 184 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
29 Of course, the answer serves to cut off plaintiff's right to amend the complaint "as a
matter of course," but "leave of court" to amend "shall be freely given when justice so
requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
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usually permits authority, direct or analogous, to be marshalled to support
most any point. In the consideration of discovery motions, the court's
discretion stems from at least three sources: (a) its general equity
powers;3" (b) the portion of Rule 1 providing that the Federal Rules
"shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action"; and (c) the portion of Rule 30(b) providing that
the "court may make any other order which justice requires to protect
the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression."
Discretion, of course, does not mean that a court is free "to modify, re-
vise, or disregard the plain terms of a rule made for its guidance."'"
However, while the denial of discovery may constitute grounds for
appeal from an adverse final judgment,3" appeals on such basis are rarely
successful.3 3 Besides establishing the abuse of discretion, appellant may
have to persuade the court that access to the information from which he
was foreclosed would probably have produced a different result below.3 4
To stem the flood of discovery motions, there has been some judicial
resort to a more insistent application of stare decisis.5 The Supreme
Court's Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, in its October,
1955, report, observed a tendency of discovery rulings to become rigidi-
fled. 6 However, the Committee's recommendations of amendments to
the Rules which would have re-emphasized the discretionary power of the
courts were not adopted by the Supreme Court. 7
A different judicial path toward the reduction of discovery motions has
30 See Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Bruno-New York, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 346, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
31 Walling v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 2 F.R.D. 416, 419 (E.D.S.C. 1942).
32 E.g. Roth v. Bird, 239 F.2d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 1956).
33 E.g. Bell v. Swift & Co., 283 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1960); Bank of America Natl Trust
& Sav. Ass'n v. Hayden, 231 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1956); Sher v. De Haven, 199 F.2d 777
(D.C. Cir. 1952) cert. denied, 345 U.S. 936 (1953); Newell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 144
F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1944).
34 See Bell v. Swift & Co., 283 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1960). For a discussion of possible
methods of obtaining interlocutory review of discovery orders, see Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 995-1000 (1961).
35 See, e.g., Schilling-Hillier S-A. Industrial & Commercial v. Virginia-Carolina Chem.
Corp., 19 F.R.D. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("On a practice point such as this where there
is much to be said on both sides the rule of stare decisis should foreclose discussion when
once the question has been considered and resolved.").
36 "[The Committee] noted the invariable tendency (accentuated by the reporting of
the striking or technical procedural decisions more extensively than of the merely
permissive rulings) of procedure to harden and become inflexible so as to be increasingly
unadaptable to developing needs in law administration and the cause of appeals else-
where, as to the legislative bodies, for reform or change."
Reprinted in 1 Moore, Federal Practice, 1 0.528[3], at 5630 (2d ed. 1960).
37 See, e.g., Proposed Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b), reprinted in 4 Moore, Federal
Practice ff 30.01[6], at 92 (Supp. 1960). The present Advisory Committee (under the
Chairmanship of Dean Acheson), recogmzng the conflicting views that have been expressed
concerning pre-trial discovery processes in the United States District Courts, has embarked
upon an extensive study of this subject, both analytical (in terms of the decided cases
and other literature) and empirical (in terms of field investigation of the actual operation
of discovery in federal litigation), with a view to recommending anyr changes of the pertinent
Rules that may appear advisable.
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been to impose upon counsel the duty to confer, in good faith, to resolve
discovery differences before the court would do so on motion38 In this
endeavor, the element of uncertainty, generated by the court's discretion
factor, probably promotes compromise.39
As applicable to antitrust cases, the Federal Rules provide three prime
instruments for discovery between parties:40 depositions, oral and writ-
ten;41 interrogatories; 42 and production, by motion" or subpoena.44 Re-
quests to admit are also authorized, 8 but whether they are truly a
discovery tool may be debatable.4 Since interrogatories, motions for
production, and requests to admit may be directed only to a party, de-
positions and subpoenas duces tecum are the pertinent discovery devices
for witnesses who are not parties.4 7
By means of these various discovery procedures, the case is expected
to take form in the light of the disclosure, marshalling, and appraisal of
the available evidence. Helpful to the same end is the pre-trial con-
ference. Although not ordinarily considered to be a discovery device,
it frequently serves a fact-finding function and may, on occasion, sup-
plant the more formal discovery methods. 9
At the threshold of discovery is the question of priority, a matter which
the Federal Rules do not expressly resolve. The need for orderly schedul-
38 For example, Rule 9(f) of the amended General Rules of the United States District
Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, effective Feb. 1, 1961, provides:
No motion [under Rule 26 through 37 inclusive of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure] . . . shall be heard unless counsel for the moving party files with the court
at or prior to the argument an affidavit certifying that he has conferred with counsel
for the opposing party in an effort in good faith to resolve by agreement the issues
raised by the motion without the intervention of the court and has been unable to
reach such an agreement. If part of the issues raised by motion have been resolved
by agreement the affidavit shall specify the issues so resolved and the issues remaining
unresolved.
39 See Dooling, Cooperation Between Counsel in Simplifying Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D.
460, 461 (1959).
40 Fed. R. Civ. P. 35 (Physical and Mental Examination of Persons) is omitted as not
of general application to antitrust litigation.
41 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-32, 45(d).
42 Fed. R. Civ. P. 33.
43 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
44 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d).
45 Fed. R. Civ. P. 36.
46 See discussion at notes 80-83, infra.
47 See notes 41-43, 45, supra.
48 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
49 See Wessel, Federal Pretrial and jury Trial Procedure (P.L.I. 1955). In Strayer, Dis-
covery in Pretrial Conference Procedure, 23 F.R.D. 347, 352 (1959), it is stated:
In summary I would say that as administered in Oregon, we have found that there
are two chief advantages in discovery at the pretrial conference. The first is that it
furnishes an easy and inexpensive way of disclosing many documents the other side
may have and developing further fields for possible discovery. It may dispense with
the necessity of taking depositions or filing interrogatories. Second, . . . it affords an
opportunity to inspect, without any depositions, interrogatories, motions or court argu-
ments all documents which the opponent intends to use at the trial.
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ing of discovery procedures promptly led to court decision. A simple
principle was judicially applied: First in time, first in right. The first
party to serve notice to take depositions would be permitted to complete
such depositions prior to being examined himself. 1
While counsel may divide on the value of obtaining the first discovery,
plaintiffs for years have lamented their disfavored position produced by
the "first notice" principle in combination with the language of Rule
2 6 (a). Under the Rule plaintiffs, without court order, may not serve notice
to take depositions until twenty days after commencement of the action.
No such time restriction applies to defendants.2 Moreover, plaintiff will
not be granted leave of court to serve such notice within the twenty-day
period merely "to secure priority over a possible attempt on the part of
defendant to take depositions."5" Rather, such leave will be granted only
for exceptional circumstances, not related to priority, such as that "the
prospective witness is about to leave the jurisdiction permanently, or for
a long period; or if the prospective witness is infirm, it may be appropri-
ate to expedite the taking of his deposition."'"
50 See Dow Chem. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 30 b. 33, Case 3 at
520 (D. Del. Oct. 5, 1960), in which it is stated:
A few months after the promulgation of the Rules in 1938 it was evidently thought
incongruous for depositions noticed by plaintiff and depositions noticed by defendant
to be conducted at the same time, and it was determined priority should be given to
the depositions first noticed. [Citing Grauer v. Schenley Prods. Co., 26 F. Supp. 768
(S.D.N.Y. 1938).]
51 Regardless of the dates scheduled in cross-notices for the commencement of the re-
spective depositions, priority is accorded to the party serving the first notice. E.g., In-
dependent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Porto Transp.,
Inc. v. Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp., 21 F.R.D. 250, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Sanib Corp.
v. United Fruit Co., 19 F.R.D. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Modigliani Glass Fibers, Inc. v. Glas-
floss Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D. 647 (E.D.N.Y. 1948); Shamokin Woolen Mills, Inc. v. Cortille
Fabrics, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); see also Mutual Fin. Corp. v. Sobol, 7 F.R.D.
111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). Service is complete upon mailing and the three day provision in
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) is inapplicable. Porto Transp., Inc. v. Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp.,
supra; see also Stover v. Universal Moulded Prods. Corp., 11 F.R.D. 90, 91 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
52 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (a) provides:
After commencement of the action the deposition may be taken without leave of court,
except that leave, granted with or without notice, must be obtained if notice of the
taking is served by the plaintiff within 20 days after commencement of the action.
The purpose of this provision, as explained in the Advisory Committee's note, is to protect
"a defendant who has not had an opportunity to retain counsel and inform himself as to
the nature of the suit; the plaintiff, of course, needs no such protection." Reprinted in 4
Moore, II 26.01[41, at 1009 (1950). Prior to the amendment of Rule 26 (a), effective
March 19, 1948, defendant had even greater protection, the former Rule providing:
By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property which is the subject of the action or without such leave after an answer has
been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken at the
instance of any party by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories
for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes.
(Emphasis added).
53 Babolia v. Local 456, Teamsters Union, 11 F.R.D. 423, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
54 Ibid. See also De Koninck v. Jordan Int'l Co., 24 Fed. Rules Serv. 26a. 16, Case 1
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1957); Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. Distillers Co., 19 F.R.D. 169,
171 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Munson Line, Inc. v. Green, 6 F.R.D. 14, 19-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
But see Keller-Dorian Colorfilm Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 9 F.R.D. 432, 434 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) seemingly overruled by the same judge in Bank of America Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n
v. Universal Pictures Co., 13 F.R.D. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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Through the years, plaintiffs have tried to overcome this obstacle to
priority. Only a handful have succeeded against the diligent defendant
who serves his own notice within the twenty-day period.5 That period,
of course, starts to run from the filing of the complaint, not from its
later service upon defendant. 6
The most frequently urged reason for overturning a defendant's pri-
ority in antitrust cases is that "plaintiff must necessarily seek to establish
55 For example, in the following cases plaintiffs, who had not served the first notice, were
unsuccessful in their motions for deposition priority: Reading-Sinram-Streat Coals, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 21 F.R.D. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Independent Prods. Corp.
v. Loew's, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Brause v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 19
F.R.D. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 19 F.R.D. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Mell v. Minkowitz, 13 F.R.D. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Zwiefler v. Sleco Laces, Inc., 11 F.R.D.
202 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Edwin H. Morris & Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 10 F.R.D.
236 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Auburn Capitol Theatre Corp. v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 83 F.
Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Hare v. Southern Pac. Co., 9 F.R.D. 307 (N.D.N.Y. 1949);
Modigliani Glass Fibers, Inc. v. Glasfloss Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D. 647 (E.D.N.Y. 1948); Isbrand-
sten v. Moller, 7 F.R.D. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Munson Line, Inc. v. Green, 6 F.R.D. 470
(S.D.N.Y. 1947); Munson Line, Inc. v. Green, 6 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Fruit Growers
Co-op. v. California Pie & Baking Co., 48 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D.NY. 1943); Alderman Tailors,
Inc. v. Alderman Tailors, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
In the following cases, plaintiffs were successful on motions to obtain deposition priority
even though they had not served the first notice: Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. Distillers
Co., 19 F.R.D. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Hillside Amusement Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,
2 F.R.D. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); cf. Kenealy v. Texas Co., 29 F. Supp. 502, 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
Cases where plaintiffs were partially successful in seeking to take depositions prior to the
taking of their depositions by defendants with priority, are cited in notes 60-65, infra.
56 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) refers to "commencement of the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 3
provides "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." In Edwin H.
Morris & Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 10 F.R.D. 236, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) it is stated:
The purpose of the 20-day delay required before a plaintiff may notice the taking of
defendant's deposition is undoubtedly to give the defendant time to examine the com-
plaint and secure an attorney. See Note of Advisory Committee on Amendments to
Rules, following amended Rule 26. It does not follow that the running of the 20-day
period should not start until the complaint is served on the defendant; if the latter were
the rule, administrative difficulties would -ensue, especially in multi-defendant cases
where, as here, the complaint was served on different defendants on different days.
By selecting the date of the filing of the complaint, the drafters of the rule fixed a
readily discernible and easily administered point in time. Moreover, I understand
that this problem was anticipated and discussed by the Advisory Committee and for
the reasons stated above, among others, the language 'commencement of the action'
was selected, and was intended to be construed in accord with Rule 3.
In Schilling-Hillier S.A. Industrial E Commercial v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 19
F.R.D. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) and Prinias v. Andreadis, 12 F.R.D. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), for
purposes of determining priority, the time period was measured from commencement of
the action in state courts, not from the date of removal to the federal court. If, after
filing a complaint, a plaintiff inexcusably delays in delivering the summons and complaint
to the marshal for service, the plaintiff will lose priority obtained thereby. Netter v. Ashland
Paper Mils, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 529, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (6 day delay), Caribbean Const.
Corp. v. Kennedy Van Suan Mfg. & Eng'r Corp., 13 F.R.D. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (17
day delay). In the latter the court states:
The practice here indulged in, if permitted to go by unchecked, could become a con-
venient stratagem for plaintiffs, willing to adopt it, to defeat the purpose of the re-
quirement of Rule 26(a), and, incidentally, to secure priority in the taking of depositions.
Simply by failing to deliver papers to the Marshal for service until after the requisite
twenty days had expired and then on the twenty-first day serving notice of deposition
upon the defedants, plaintiffs, in practical terms, could vitiate the requirement of Rule
26(a) that leave of court be obtained within the twenty-day period following the
commencement of suit.
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many of its allegations by proof from the defendants themselves. 57 This
argument alone, once successful many years ago,58 is now held insufficient
to provide the "unusual circumstances" courts require to reverse the
normal rule of priority.5" Several years ago there was also an experiment
with staggered depositions, each party being required to examine the
other for alternating periods of equal duration.60 This approach, how-
ever, has not become prevalent.6
Where lack of jurisdiction or improper venue is urged by defendant, a
limited exception to the priority principle has arisen. Plaintiff may be
permitted to examine defendant on such issues prior to defendant's tak-
ing of plaintiff's deposition on the merits. 2
57 Hillside Amusement Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 275, 276 (S.D.N.Y.
1942).
58 Ibid. But see Auburn Capitol Theatre Corp. v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 83 F. Supp.
872, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) wherein the court says: I
It is true that plaintiffs must establish their case by proof to be elicited, in large measure,
from defendants, but by reason of the Government's anti-trust litigation they are fully
advised of the nature, extent and availability of such proof. Defendants have been
diligent; no special circumstances appear which would warrant taking from the 'Schine'
defendants their priority of examination.
In Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. Distillers Co., 19 F.R.D. 169, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
that plaintiff's proof would have to come from defendants was mentioned as one of a
number of factors supporting the reversal of priority.
59 See Edwin H. Morris & Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. 10 F.R.D. 236, 238 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) where it is stated:
On the papers before me I can find no particular reason why the taking of one set of
depositions should precede the other, unless I am arbitrarily to rule that in all triple
damage suits under the antitrust laws the plaintiff is entitIed to take his depositions
first. And if this is to be so in actions of this type, it will be argued that some similar
ruling one way or the other should be made in contract actions, negligence actions and
so on. The mere type of action should not be so controlling; and I find no special
circumstances here to justify changing the normal course of events under the notices
as served.
See also Reading-Sinram-Streat Coals v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 21 F.R.D. 333, 334
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) wherein the court states:
as a general rule, it would be preferable that the defendant be afforded first right to
take the deposition of the plaintiff. Under the present federal rules a plaintiff may serve
a vague and general complaint and the defendant should have an opportunity early in
the proceedings to find out the real basis upon which the plaintiff is proceeding, which
can only be done by the deposition and discovery procedure, since bills of particulars
are sledom, if ever, granted in the federal courts.
See also Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Sanib
Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 19 F.R.D. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
to Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 11 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) (Weinfeld, J.).
'1 But see Gerber Prods. Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 25 Fed. Rules Serv. 30b.33,
Case 4 (S.D.N.Y. April 25, 1958), where Judge Weinfeld again ordered alternating deposi-
tions in consolidated actions.
02 Deep South Oil Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 21 F.R.D. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). But
cf. River Plate Corp. v. Forestal Land, Timber & Ry. Co., 185 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(permitting those of the defendants, who had priority and were not contesting jurisdiction,
to examine plaintiff on the merits prior to plaintiff's examination on jurisdiction). See also
Modigliani Glass Fibers, Inc. v. Glasfloss Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D. 647 (E.D.N.Y.' 1948). In
Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. Distillers Co., 19 F.R.D. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), the juris-
diction issue was referred to, among several grounds, for overturning defendants' priority
and permitting plaintiff to proceed first and conduct unlimited depositions. However, other
cases have held, even where plaintiff served the first notice, that it proceed initially to
examine on jurisdiction only. See, e.g., Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, 159 F. Supp.
14 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Chero v. Compania Maritima Hari Ltda. Panama, S.A., 15 F.R.D. 110
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There are a few recurrent situations where, notwithstanding a party's
service of the first notice, priority has not been obtained or has subse-
quently been lost. For example, if the first notice is defective or other-
wise invalid, it does not secure priority.63 Also, where a witness is ill,64
or where the prior party fails to proceed with due diligence,65 priority
may be lost.
It behooves a party, upon whom the first notice to take depositions
has been served, to cross-serve promptly his own notice of the depositions
he wishes to take. This action may limit his adversary's priority66 to
the depositions of the persons specifically named or identified in the first
notice,67 after which the depositions specified in the second notice may
be taken. However, until such first-noticed depositions are completed,
the party lacking priority is barred not only from taking depositions6 8
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). But cf. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference,
14 F.R.D. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
63 Mell v. Minkowitz, 13 F.R.D. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Bergen Toy & Novelty Co. v.
Shaland, 11 F.R.D. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). See also Stover v. Universal Moulded Prods.
Corp., 11 F.R.D. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Manufacturers Retail Men's
Stores, Inc., 6 F.R.D. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Cf. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. Distillers
Co., 19 F.R.D. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
64 Walsh v. Pullman Co., 10 F.R.D. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); see also Morrison Export Co. v.
Goldstone, 12 F.R.D. 258, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
65 B. & B. Theatres Corp. v. Atlantic Enterprises, Inc., 22 Fed. Rules Serv. 30b.33, Case 3
(N.D. Ga. May 22, 1956); cf. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23
F.R.D. 237 (D. Del. 1959); Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. Distillers Co., 23 Fed. Rules
Serv. 30b.33, Case 3 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1956). Lengthy delay in completing depositions is
a ground for permitting the opposing party to proceed with interrogatories, Kurt M. Jach-
mann Co. v. Marine Office of America, 16 F.R.D. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), or production of
documents pursuant to Rule 34. Kurt M. Jachmann Co. v. Hartley, Cooper & Co., 17
F.R.D. 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); cf. Shulman, Inc. v. Shertz, 18 F.R.D. 94 (E.D. Pa. 1955)
(six month delay in resuming deposition held, under circumstances, not to warrant per-
mitting adversary's interrogatories prior to completion of depositions.)
'66 Priority of discovery involves, at the minimum, the utilization of such discovery de-
vices as are in aid of the taking of the first noticed depositions as, for example, a subpoena
duces tecum under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d).
67 Commercio E Industria Continental, S.A. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 19 F.R.D. 265, 266
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); Photographic Implements & Distributing Co. v. Elgeet Optical Co., Civ.
No. 88-168, S.D.N.Y., Dec. 31, 1953. But cf. Armstrong Cork Co. v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 16 F.R.D. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). To the extent that a notice to take depositions is
directed, e.g., at "such other officers having knowledge of the facts," the "description"
requirement of F. R. Civ. P. 30(a) has not been met. Such language does not enlarge the
number of persons that may be examined pursuant to the notice. See, e.g., Shenker v.
United States, 25 F.R.D. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. Distillers
Co., 19 F.R.D. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Mattingly v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co.,
Inc., 12 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Morrison Export Co. v. Goldstone, 12 F.R.D. 258
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); Orange County Theatres, Inc. v. Levy, 26 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
See, in connection with the adjustment of priorities where not all parties on a given side
serve the first notice, Drews v. Eastern Sausage & Provision Co., 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 30b.33,
Case 2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1954); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D.
395, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
68 The preclusion applies to depositions not only of the party with priority, but also
of other parties, Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y.), and
of witnesses. Fox v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 202 (D. Del. 1951). See also
Fruit Growers Co-op. v. California Pie & Baking Co., 48 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D.N.Y. 1943).
But see, Harry Von Tilzer Music Publishing Co. v. Leo Feist, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 96 (S.D.N.Y.
10ali
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but also from utilizing other discovery devices such as interrogatories69
or production.70
Discovery need not commence by notice to take depositions. For
interrogatories and requests to admit, the Rules prescribe no time limita-
tion for defendant, but plaintiff may not serve either of them, without
court order, until ten days after filing of the complaint. 71 Rule 34 con-
tains no time restriction upon parties with respect to a motion for pro-
duction. If discovery is begun by one of these devices, it is questionable
whether it confers any priority apart from the inherent right to a timely
response to the particular demand made.72
An ever-intriguing tactical question is the choice between oral deposi-
tions and interrogatories as the means for discovery of particular sub-
jects. It is recognized that interrogatories, while normally much less
expensive than oral depositions, are not always as effective because they
lack the cross-examination feature. 73 On the other hand, in matters of
complex data, or where dealing with multiple parties or multiple repre-
sentatives of parties each having only a partial segment of the total in-
formation, oral depositions can be equally, if not more, unrewarding.
Interrogatories are especially useful where the data sought pertains to
facts and figures that would otherwise be the subject of the production
of voluminous documents.74 The answers to interrogatories may be used
09 See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.R.D. 237 (D.
Del. 1959); Shulman, Inc. v. Shertz, 18 F.R.D. 94 (E.D. Pa. 1955); cf. Kurt M. Jachmann
Co. v. Marine Office of America, 16 F.R.D. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
70 See, e.g., Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 18 F.R.D. 318
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Colonial Airlines, Inc. v. Janas, 13 F.R.D. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Holt v.
The James Sheridan, 12 F.R.D. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). But cf. Forstmann Woolen Co. v.
Manufacturers Retail Men's Stores, Inc., 6 F.R.D. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
71 Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, 36.
72 See Dow Chem. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 30b.33, Case 3 (D.
Del. Oct. 5, 1960) ; Eastern Fireproofing Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 21 F.R.D. 290 (D.
Mass. 1957); Court De Graw Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 20 F.R.D. 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
But see, Konczakowski v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); cf.
Fitzmaurice v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 30b.33, Case 2 (ED. Pa. Oct. 31,
1960); Breeland v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 179 F. Supp. 464, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See also
Holt v. The James Sheridan, 12 F.R.D. 72, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
73 Similarly, as to depositions on written interrogatories pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 31,
see, e.g., Smith Frozen Foods v. Merchants Refrigerating Co., Inc., 14 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Worth v. Trans World Films, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 197, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); V. 0.
Machinoimport v. Clark Equip. Co., 11 F.R.D. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Alfred Bell & Co.
v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 5 F.R.D. 327, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). Courts, however, have the
power, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b), to order that a deposition be taken by written inter-
rogatories rather than oral examination where special circumstances exist, e.g., Mortensen
v. Honduras Shipping Co., 18 F.R.D. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Kurt M. Jachmann Co. v.
Hartley, Cooper & Co., 16 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Failure, under certain circumstances,
to order depositions on written interrogatories instead of on oral examination may be a
reversible abuse of discretion. Hyam v. American Export Lines, Inc., 213 F.2d 221 (2d Cir.
1954).
74 When information contained in voluminous documents is sought, a party may be
required to seek such information by interrogatories, rather than production, in the first
instance. Margeson v. Boston & Me. R.R., 16 F.R.D. 200 (D. Mass. 1954); cf. Goldlawr,
Inc. v. Shubert, 25 F.R.D. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Thompson v. Hoitsma, 19 F.R.D. 112 (D.
N.J. 1956).
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to the same extent as depositions,7 and there may be a continuing obli-
gation on the part of the respondent to update replies in the event that
original answers require modification in the light of subsequent events or
knowledge.76
Occasionally, a party served With interrogatories finds it less burden-
some to produce documents than to compile answers to interrogatories
founded upon such documents. In such instances, courts have authorized
the submission of documents, in lieu of answers to interrogatories, upon
timely objections to the interrogatories and upon showing that the an-
swers would require compilations which would impose an undue and
excessive burden upon the respondent, that there was no compilation in
existence, and that the party did not intend to make such a compilation
in preparation of its own case.77 Moreover, there is an enhanced likeli-
hood that such objection to compiling answers from documents will be
sustained if the relevant documents had been produced prior to service
of the interrogatories.78 However, where the respondent does not timely
object on the ground of burdensomeness, he generally will not be per-
mitted to submit documents in lieu of answers to interrogatories.79
There has been some controversy and confusion concerning the sepa-
rate office served by requests to admit,80 as distinguished from interroga-
75 Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 ("Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be inquired
into under Rule 26(b), and the answers may be used to the same extent as provided in
Rule 26(d) for the use of the deposition of a party.")
7 Compare Lunn v. United Aircraft Corp., 25 F.R.D. 186 (D. Del. 1960), and Smith
v. Acadia Overseas Freighters, Ltd., 120 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1953), with Novick v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 18 F.RD. 296 (W.D. Pa. 1955). See Developments in the Law-Dis-
covery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 961-63 (1961).
77 See, e.g., Erone Corp. v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 22 F.R.D. 494, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Konczakowski v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 588, 593 (S.DN.Y. 1957); Caldwell-
Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 12 F.R.D. 531, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
78 See, e.g., Erone Corp. v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 22 F.R.D. 494, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Hopkinson Theatre, Inc. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 18 F.R.D. 379, 381-2 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 18 F.R.D. 503, 507-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Pappas v. Loew's Inc., 13 F.R.D. 471, 473 (M.D. Pa. 1953). But see, Chatman v. American
Export Lines Inc., 20 F.R.D. 176, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), where it is stated:
It is undoubtedly true that a duplication of data will result from requiring answers to
interrogatories on the same facts to be found in the documents defendant produced for
plaintiff's inspection. This, however, does not preclude plaintiff's utilization of both
methods. Rules 33 and 34 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A., serve different functions.
Defendant's answers to interrogatories via rule 33 give facts as it sees the facts, and
have the effect of admissions. Production of documents pursuant to rule 34 gives
plaintiff the primary source material without any limitation, explanation, or inter-
pretation by defendant. In the absence of proof of harassment and oppressive burden,
a party may utilize both rules. Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n, D.C.N.D. Ohio,
10 F.R.D. 152; 4 Moore, Federal Practice, p. 2288 (2d ed. 1950); cf. Woods v. Robb,
5 Cir., 171 F.2d 539, 541.
79 Austin Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 302, 304 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) wherein it is stated:
Where an interrogatory asks for specific figures it is no answer to the interrogatory
to make records available so that the other party to the litigation can do the work of
ascertaining the true answer to the interrogatories.
80 See Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 968-70 (1961). See
also Bogucki, Discovery in Patent Cases, 23 F.R.D. 549 (1959). The author states:
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tories. Where admissions are requested, the substantial sanction im-
posed for denial of a fact subsequently proven true, that is, payment of
the reasonable expenses incurred in making such proof,8' has persuaded
most courts to restrict the issues covered by such requests to matters as
to which controversy may not reasonably be anticipated. 2 It has been
stated that "Rule 36 obviously presupposes that the information
contained in the request has already been 'discovered.' , The sanc-
tion attendant upon a request to admit often has the psychological effect
of spurring the other party to admit sooner than it might when confronted
by other discovery devices.
While requests have utility, their proponent may be exposing himself
to certain unforeseen consequences. In jurisdictions where requests are
limited to undisputed matters, a party by hypothesis may propound only
those "matters of fact" which he confidently believes are beyond, or un-
worthy of, dispute. It would be consistent for courts to say that the pro-
ponent of a request to admit himself admits the proposition when asking
his adversary to do so. Rule 3 6 (b), to encourage the elimination of issues,
provides that "any admission . . . pursuant to such request is for the
purpose of the pending action only." This protection is not expressly
Admissions are very little used. I think that Mr. Shafroth found in one of his studies
that admissions were used in only three per cent of the trials.... I don't know why,
except that perhaps the weapon is too potent. Perhaps it is because of the cost features
which are attached, or the danger that admissions will be used in retaliation, but in
any event there is little evidence of the use of admissions in the reported cases.
81 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
82 See, e.g., Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 917 (2d Cir. 1959)
("Rule 36 was designed to eliminate the necessity of proving essentially undisputed and
peripheral issues of fact."); Driver v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 24 F.R.D. 473, 475 (E.D. Pa.
1959) ("The Rule cannot be employed as a substitute for discovery. . .. ."); Benton v.
McCarthy, 23 F.R.D. 235, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ("F.R. Civ. P. 36 . . . was designed to
obtain admission of facts as to which there is no real dispute and which the adverse party
can admit cleanly, without qualifications."); California v. The Jules Fribourg, 19 F.R.D.
432, 436 (NJ). Cal. 1955) ("There is general agreement that requests for admission are
not to be treated as substitutes for discovery processes to uncover evidence, and that they
may not be applied to controverted legal issues lying at the heart of the case.") See also 4
Moore, Federal Practice ff 36.04 (2d ed. 1950); Petition of Reinauer Oil Transp. Inc., 19
F.R.D. 5 (D. Mass. 1956); Alaska Credit Bureau of Juneau v. Stevenson, 15 F.R.D. 409
(D. Alaska 1954); Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 9 F.R.D. 741 (N.D.
Ohio 1949). Cf. Johnstone v. Cronlund, 25 F.R.D. 42, 44 (E.D. Pa. 1960). But in Tillman
v. Fickencher, 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 36a.27, Case 1 (E.D. Pa. March 31, 1960), the court
stated:
Although there are cases to the contrary, this court is of the opinion that the better
rule is that the fact that admissions concern controversial issues of fact does not of
itself make them objectionable. Indeed, since the purpose of the rule is to eliminate the
necessity of proof of uncontroverted facts and since the party requested has the op-
portunity to deny that the requested admissions are true, full use of the procedure
provided will enable the parties to determine before trial just which issues of fact are
controverted and which are not.
See also Griffin v. Wilhelmsen, 24 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1959); United States v. Ehbauer,
13 F.R.D. 462 (W.D. Mo. 1952); Jones v. Boyd Truck Lines, 11 F.R.D. 67 (W.D. Mo,
1951); Dulansky v. Iowa-Iflinois Gas & Elec. Co., 92 F. Supp. 118 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
83 United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 203,
204 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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applicable to the request itself. Conceivably, a request to admit may have
the same consequence as a pleading allegation,84 being an admission of
the proposition not only for purposes of the pending case but available
for evidentiary purposes in subsequent cases. An interrogatory would
stand in a different posture and might be the more appropriate procedure
for the party hesitant about admitting, for all purposes, his own request.8 5
The remaining discovery instrument is production and inspection of
documents, which may be the most rewarding as well as the most burden-
some procedure, in an antitrust suit. Where large corporations or cor-
porate families are involved, with multitudes of files departmentalized
and localized throughout the country, conscientious efforts to satisfy
even well tailored requests for documents can be overwhelming. Unlike
the other discovery procedures, a motion for production of documents
requires a showing of "good cause."86 What will constitute "good cause"
must vary as the needs of the parties differ from case to case.8 7 In anti-
trust actions of broad compass, "good cause" should inspire a close look
at issue definition, relevance and specificity in view of the harsh burdens
that an uncontrolled venture into documents may generate.88
To avoid a showing of "good cause," disclosure of documents has
been attempted by means of the other discovery instruments; for ex-
ample, notices to produce appended to notices to take depositions;8 9 in-
84 See Commentary, 1 Fed. Rules Serv. 661, 686-87 (1939). A party's complaint in
another proceeding was received as an admission in each of the following cases: Dixie
Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Holland, 255 F.2d 304, 310 (6th Cir. 1958); Great Am. Indem.
Co. v. Rose, 242 F.2d 269, 271-2 (5th Cir. 1957); Frank R. Jelleff, Inc. v. Braden, 233
F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1956);
Anderson v. Tway, 143 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 861 (1945); Douds
v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 148 F. Supp. 953 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
85 See Commentary, 1 Fed. Rules Serv. supra note 84; In Leonia Amusement Corp. v.
Loew's, Inc., 18 F.R.D. 503, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the court stated that:
With respect to a number of the interrogatories the questions seem to me to be requests
for admissions of fact and there should be a provision in the order that plaintiff's use
of defendants' answers to these should be limited as required by Rule 36(b), F.R.C.P.
86 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
87 4 Moore, Federal Practice 1 34.08 (2d ed. 1950).
88 In this regard, the procedure adopted by the court in United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
23 F.R.D. 1, 3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), should be noted. The court stated:
Because of the monumental difficulties which would necessarily be imposed upon the
defendants, particularly in the production of foreign documents, it would appear the
most feasible course to order, at this time, the minimum discovery which is likely to
provide sufficient information for, at least, a preliminary narrowing of the issues.
After such preliminary narrowing, the balance of discovery can be measured against the
frame of reference of the issues, as so narrowed, rather than against the broad frame of
reference of the complaint which is the only one presently available. After the narrow-
ing of the issues, much of the production presently sought might be determined not to
be necessary. To effectuate the result sought, I deem it advisable to order, at present,
only that the interrogatories ... be answered.
See also Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 25 F.R.D. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); cf. United States v.
Continental Can Co., 22 F.R.D. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
89 Although it was Professor Moore's view that, as to parties, "designation in the notice
to take depositions of the papers desired to have produced is sufficient," 4 Moore, Federal
Practice ff 26.10, at 1052-53 (2d ed. 1950), and despite some early decisions supporting this
position, Sekely v. Salkind, 10 F.R.D. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (treated notice as Rule 34 mo-
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terrogatories seeking the contents of documents; 90 and questions on oral
depositions designed to require a witness, personally unacquainted with
the subject, to read office files and report their contents the next day.9'
Generally, these maneuvers have not succeeded against unwilling parties. 92
Of course, apart from a Rule 34 motion, production may be compelled
by a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 45(d).91 However, while Rule
tion) ;Smith v. Bentley, 9 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Society of Independent Motion Pic-
ture Producers v. United Detroit Theatres Corp., 8 F.R.D. 453 (E.D. Mich. 1948) (treated
nofice as Rule 34 motion), it is now clear that production cannot be compelled by a notice to
produce. See, e.g., Shenker v. United States, 25 F.R.D. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Deep South Oil
Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 21 F.R.D. 340, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Loew's Int'l Corp., 18 F.R.D. 489, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Supine
v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 21 F.R.D. 42, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
00 Such interrogatories are generally held improper. See, e.g., Coyne v. Monongahela
Connecting R.R., 24 F.R.D. 357, 358 (W.D. Pa. 1959); E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.R.D. 237, 239 (D. Del. 1959); United States v. Loew's, Inc.,
23 F.R.D. 178, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Cannaday v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 19 F.R.D. 261, 263
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); Stout v. Mason, 17 F.R.D. 93, 96 (E.D. Pa. 1954). But cf. 4 Moore,
Federal Practice, ff 26.23[8], at 1140, II 33.22 at 2326 (2d ed. 1950). In a few instances,
courts, upon the hearing of objections to such interrogatories, have treated them as motions
for production. See, e.g., Novick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 18 F.R.D. 296, 299 (W.D. Pa7.
1955), wherein it is stated:
In the interest . .. of preventing duplicity of action and repetition, and in causing
undue delay, it is my belief that what is essentially a technical objection of this kind
should be overruled. I shall treat the request as a motion to produce certain photographs
pursuant to Rule 34.
Taylor v. Central R.R. of N.J., 21 F.R.D. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). But see Blau v. Lamb, 20
F.R.D. 411, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), where the courts says:
Defendants object to all interrogatories requesting copies of documents. Rule 34,
F. R. Civ. P., provides the means for obtaining discovery and inspection of documents.
That is by motion based on papers showing good cause. The rules put the burden on
the party who wants the inspection to go to court and prove his right. Litigants, as
here, often try to shift to the objecting party the burden of going to court by disguising
a motion for discovery and inspection as an interrogatory which can only be attacked
by an objection in court. When that is done they meet the objection with the proof
of good cause which they ought to have supplied in the first place. There is authority
for this practice, Alfred Pearson & Co. v. Hayes, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 9 F.R.D. 210, but it
seems to me justifiable only where the right to discovery and inspection is indisputable.
I prefer to follow Castro v. A. H. Bull & Co., D.C.S.D.N.Y., 9 F.R.D. 84, and Banana
Service Co. v. United Fruit Co., D.C.D. Mass., 15 F.R.D. 106. Objections to inter-
rogatories requesting copies of documents sustained.
91 See, denying a motion to compel such answers at an oral deposition, Deep South Oil
Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 25 F.R.D. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See also, Heiner v. North
Am. Coal Corp., 3 F.R.D. 64, 65 (W.D. Pa. 1942).
92 See notes 89-91 supra.
93 There is authority for the view that production of a party's documents pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d) does not, itself, entitle the adversary to examine the documents. See,
e.g., Reid v. C. H. Cronin, Inc., 15 F.R.D. 337, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). The court therein
states:
When a subpoena is served on a party requiring him to produce docunients at his de-
position they may be used for purposes other than the adversary's perusal, such as, to
refresh deponent's recollection or to establish their existence, etc. Here plaintiff sought
their production that he might examine them. For such purpose he must resort to
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. rule 34.
See also Joseph L. Lee, Inc. v. Margon Corp., 18 F.R.D. 390, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Isrel
v. Shapiro, 3 F.R.D. 175, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). If a deponent uses a document to refresh
his recollection, the examiner may view it for purposes of cross-examination. Schwartz v.
Broadcast Music, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 31, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). In Joseph L. Lee, Inc. v. Margon
Corp., supra, the court held that a showing of "good cause" was inapposite to a motion to
quash a subpoena duces tecum, believing that production pursuant to subpoena did not
entitle the proponent to examine his adversary's documents. The sole test there applied
was whether production was unreasonable and oppressive. But cf. Hall Bartlett Prods. v.
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45 does not expressly require "good cause," upon a motion to quash it
is now established that the proponent of the subpoena must satisfy the
"good cause" requirement of Rule 34.9'
A fertile field of controversy is the scope of discovery. Briefly stated,
the information sought by discovery must be relevant to the issues
in an action or must be useful in uncovering the existence of such
information. 5 Within these wide limits, there are numerous excep-
tions-matters Which are absolutely privileged, such as attorney-client
communications; 9 6 matters which have a qualified privilege that yields
to a compelling need for disclosure, such as attorney's work product97
Republic Pictures Corp., 20 F.R.D. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) where a showing of "good cause"
was required although the proponent of the subpoena expressly disavowed any intent to
inspect the documents, limiting the purpose of production to refreshing the memory of
the witness. In courts which require the proponent of a subpoena, upon a motion to
quash, to show "good cause," (see cases cited in note 94, infra), quaere whether such courts
would require the proponent to bring a further motion pursuant to Rule 34, and make the
same showing again, in order to examine the documents. See 4 Moore, Federal Practice
ff 34.02[21 (b) n. 6, at 2426 (2d ed. 1950) wherein it is stated that:
If the scope of discovery under Rules 34 and 45 is the same.., there would seem to be
no basis for restricting the right of a party to inspect documents, etc. produced in
response to a subpoena duces tecum rather than under Rule 34.
94 See, e.g., Ostow & Jacobs, Inc. v. Morgan-Jones, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 208, 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); Mitchell v. Strauss, I Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 34.13, Case 5 (D.R.I. Feb. 2, 1959);
Sensytrol Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 18 F.R.D. 279, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States
v. 6.82 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 195, 197 (D.N.M. 1955); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Shields, 17 F.R.D. 273, 275-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Continental Distilling Corp. v. Humphrey,
17 F.R.D. 237, 241 (D.D.C. 1955); Panamusica Venezuela CA. v. American Steel Export
Co., 16 F.R.D. 280, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 31,
33 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Demeulenaere v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 13 F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); Sagorsky v. Malyon, 12 F.R.D. 486, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); North v. Lehigh Valley
Transit Co., 10 F.R.D. 38, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1950). But see Joseph L. Lee, Inc. v. Margon Corp.,
supra note 93. Where a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d) is directed
to a witness who is not a party to the action, Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, pertaining to inter-party
discovery, is inapplicable; hence, it has been held that a showing of "good cause" is not
required in support of the subpoena. Shepherd v. Castle, 20 F.R.D. 184 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
95 Curtis v. Loew's, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 444, 447 (D.N.J. 1957); Vilastor Kent Theatre
Corp. v. Brandt, 18 F.R.D. 199, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also 4 Moore, Federal Practice
ff 26.16, at 1064 (2d ed. 1950), Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940,
1007 (1961). The criteria for the scope of examination on depositions (Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)) are specifically applicable to the other two inter-party discovery tools-interroga-
tories (Fed. R. Civ. P. 33) and production (Fed. R. Civ. P. 34). The provisions of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 30(b) (Orders for the Protection of Parties and Deponents) likewise are ap-
plicable to depositions, interrogatories and production.
96 Both Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 refer to matters "not privileged"
as within the scope of discovery. Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438,
440-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); see 4 Moore, supra note 95, ff 26.22, at 1084. For a discussion of
the scope of the attorney-client privilege, see Wyzanski, J., in United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). See also Sher v. De Haven, 199 F.2d 777,
779-81 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 936 (1953) (Doctor-Patient Privilege).
97 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947), stating that:
Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where
production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may
properly be had.
Helverson v. J. J. Newberry Co., 16 F.R.D. 330, 334-45 (W.D. Mo. 1954); Leonia Amuse-
ment Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See Transmirra Prods.
Corp. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 33.351, Case I (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,
1960), for an interesting discussion of the relationship between the attorney-client privilege
and attorney's "work product."
PRE-TRIAL IN ANTITRUST CLAIMS
or grand jury minutes; s and matters respecting which a court
may foreclose discovery or limit use of information where the discovering
party's "need to know" does not outweigh the general interest in protect-
ing the other party's trade secrets or other proprietary and confidential
data." In the last category, when courts have been satisfied that trade
secrets are involved, they have postponed disclosure until trial needs
would more clearly require it,100 have allowed disclosure but imposed
conditions for the protection of parties,1 1 or have denied complete dis-
closure because it was found to be unnecessary.
10 2
Since relevancy is the touchstone of the scope of examination, where
issues have not been defined through pretrial conference and order, the
problem arises as to what extent the pleadings govern. In such event, the
statement of claim is the critical guide. The pleadings, however, need not
contain language that has express and specific reference to every item of
discovery, provided that each item may be logically related to the
matters raised in the pleadings. The principle is oft-stated that relevancy
is tested by the broad-gauged subject matter involved in the action in
contrast to the possibly narrower issues raised by the pleadings.103 By
the same token, discovery as to express pleading issues may be barred
if the court concludes, on the basis of progress made in discovery, that
such issues have evaporated in the light of the factual disclosures. 1 4
Somewhat anomalous is the frequent objection interposed to discovery
inquiries on the ground that they do not probe facts but call, instead, for
98 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) ("This 'indispensable
secrecy of grand jury proceedings,' .. must not be broken except where there is a com-
pelling necessity.")
S9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b) authorizes a court to order "that secret processes, developments,
or research need not be disclosed, . . ." See 4 Moore, Federal Practice f[ 26.22[3], at 1087,
ff 34.15, at 2468-9 (2d ed. 1950); see also Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv.
L. Rev. 940, 1017-18 (1961). In connection with the authority in Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b) to
order "that the examination shall be held with no one present except the parties to the
action and their officers or counsel," such an order would be proscribed in certain govern-
ment antitrust actions by 37 Stat. 731 (1913), 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1913).
100 International Nickel Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F.R.D. 392, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1954);
Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 10 F.R.D. 458, 460 (D. Del. 1950); Lever
Bros. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 38 F. Supp. 680, 683 (D. Md. 1941).
101 V. D. Anderson Co. v. Helena Cotton Oil Co., 117 F. Supp. 932, 948-49 (E.D. Ark.
1953).
102 Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 477, 480 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
103 See, e.g., Transmirra Prods. Corp. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d
33.351, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1960); Rose v. Bourne, 15 F.R.D. 362, 363 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Chemical Specialties Co., Inc. v. Ciba Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 10 F.R.D. 500,
501 (D.N.J. 1950); Stevenson v. Melady, 1 F.R.D. 329, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Lewis v.
United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 946, 947 (D. Conn. 1939). However, in anti-
trust cases of wide dimension
practical considerations dictate that the parties should not be permitted to roam in
shadow zones of relevancy and to explore matter which does not presently appear
germane on the theory that it might conceivably become so.
Broadway & Ninety-Sixth Street Realty Co. v. Loew's Corp., 21 F.R.D. 347, 352 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
104 See, e.g., Vilastor Kent Theatre Corp. v. Brandt, 18 F.R.D. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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a party's contentions, or opinions and conclusions. A large number of
cases have sustained such objections,'0 5 though Professor Moore's criti-
cism106 has done much to reverse the trend. Indiscriminate upholding
of such objections tends to run counter to the Supreme Court's view that
it is a function of discovery to narrow and clarify the issues.'
Some theorists will say that the place for disclosure of contentions is
at the pre-trial conference-not in discovery. 08 But this merely shifts
to overburdened courts a function that, in many cases, could proceed
without such formal supervision.0 9 There is a growing body of decisions
which wisely permit interrogatories to explore contentions, conclusions
and opinions." 0 As for depositions, when the witness is knowledgeable
and speaks authoritatively for a party, examination into contentions has
been held to be equally appropriate."'
III. SuMMAY JUDGMENT
It is unwise to proceed with discovery in an antitrust civil suit
without evaluating summary judgment potentialities. Comment has
105 See, e.g., Seff v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 11 F.R.D. 597, 598 (N.D. Ohio
1951), a treble damage case. Cases are collected, in 4 Moore, Federal Practice, ff 33.17, at
2303-08 (2d ed. 1950). Some courts attempt to draw a distinction between contentions as
to facts and those as to law. See Aktiebolaget Vargos v. Clark, 8 F.R.D. 635, 636 (D.D.C.
1949); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 168 F. Supp. 904,
906 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). However, this is unlikely to provide a sound basis of decision.
Contentions are likely to mix both fact claim and legal theory so that, with a little in-
genuity in the draftsmanship, an interrogatory calling purely for a contention of law should
be rare. Cf. United States v. Renault, Inc., 1960 Trade Cases, ff 69,841 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
United States v. Selby, 25 F.R.D. 12, 13-14 (N.D. Ohio 1960); Webster Motor Car Co. v.
Packard Motor Car Co., 16 FAR.D. 350, 351 (D.D.C. 1954).
108 4 Moore, Federal Practice, II 33.17, at 2310-12 (2d ed. 1950).
107 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48
(1957).
108 Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 942, 1043 (1961). In United
States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 22 F.R.D. 300, 302 (D.D.C. 1958), the
court states:
It is not the purpose of discovery to ascertain what arguments the opposing party in-
tends to use in support of his contentions. Accordingly, the objections to the inter-
rogatory are sustained. Nevertheless, the subject matter of the interrogatory may ap-
priately be considered at a pretrial hearing.
109 Upon the concession by counsel that the disclosures would have to be made at the
pre-trial conference, the Court required plaintiff to answer defendant's interrogatories calling
for contentions in United States v. Continental Can Company, 22 F.R.D. 241, 247 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), a Clayton Act, Section 7, case.
110 See, e.g., United States v. Renault Inc., 1960 Trade Cases, f[ 69,841 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(antitrust); Coyne v. Monongahela Connecting R.R. Co., 24 F.R.D. 357, 359 (W.D. Pa.
1959) (personal injuries); B & S Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24
F.R.D. 1, 3, 6-7 (S.D. Texas 1959) (negligence); American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania
Petroleum Prod. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 683 (D.R.I. 1959) (breach of warranty); Territory of
Alaska v. The Arctic Maid, 135 F. Supp. 164, 165-66 (D. Alaska 1955) (license tax); Inter-
borough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 14 F.R.D. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (anti-
trust); Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 12 F.R.D. 531, 543-44
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (antitrust). See also Lizza & Sons, Inc. v. Diminico & Pallotta, Inc., 23
F.R.D. 143, 144 (D. Mass. 1959); Curtis v. Loew's Inc., 20 F.R.D. 444, 449-50 (D.NJ.
1957).
"'I Broadway & Ninety-Sixth St. Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 347, 352-53, 359-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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been directed at a growing reluctance of courts to grant summary judg-
ment motions," 2 notwithstanding continued advocacy of their utility
in the disposition of the protracted case. 13 If summary judgment is a
goal, it has to be aimed at from the beginning of discovery. Counsel
who wander too far from the central core of conflict, building a vast dis-
covery record that ranges far and wide over the conceivable areas of
relevancy, will be ever enlarging the burden of showing that in such a
record there are no triable issues." 4
The Rule 56 standard for summary judgment is the absence of a
"cgenuine issue as to any material fact."' " The Rule, however, does not
state by what measure the court must be convinced that there is no such
genuine issue. The courts unanimously place the burden of persuasion
upon the movant,"116 and the test, as formulated in the various circuits, is
strict.117 However, there is a danger that counsel may be misled by the
verbalization of the standard in selected appellate decisions. Some cases
say that the "slightest doubt" as to the facts will bar the motion;" 8
others note that any and all doubts must be resolved against the
movant,11  but the doubts, it has been stated, must be reasonable, not
fanciful or speculative; 2 ' and still other courts insist that the truth be
112 See Searis, Methods of Shortening Trials, 23 F.R.D. 603-04 (1959). In United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 157 F. Supp. 877, 879-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), the Court did "not
reach the classical summary judgment question of whether there is a genuine issue as to
any material fact." Rather, the Court deemed "it sound judicial administration to permit
a trial for such additional evidence and clarification as may be relevant." However, it was
pointed out that the Court did "not intend to suggest that the summary judgment rule is
inapplicable to antitrust cases simply because of their dimension.... The Court holds only
that because of the unusual features of this case a trial is warranted.. . ." See Life Music
v. Broadcast Music, 23 F.R.D. 181, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
113 See, e.g., Bicks, Court Congestion and the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 417, 432-24 (1958);
Dooling, Cooperation Between Counsel in Simplifying Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 460,
465 (1959). See also Handbook, 38, n.43, 25 F.R.D. 389 n.43 (1960); United States v.
Employing Plasterers Ass'n 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954).
114 See Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1956)
("The record before us is far too confused and cumbersome to warrant an affirmance on
this phase of the case.")
115 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), states:
The judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.
116 6 Moore, Federal Practice ff 56.15[31, at 2123-33 (2d ed. 1950).
117 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 6 (1945) ("Rule 56 should be cautiously
invoked."); Evers v. Buxbaum, 253 F.2d 356, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Avrick v. Rockmont
Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1946).
118 Peckham v. Ronrico Corp., 171 F.2d 653, 657 (1st Cir. 1948); Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464, 470-01 (2d Cir. 1946); Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149
F.2d 130, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1945).
119 Cameron v. Vancouver Plywood Corp., 266 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1959); Griffeth
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 226 F.2d 661, 669 (9th Cir. 1955); Sarnoff v. Ciaglia, 165
F.2d 167, 168 (3d Cir. 1947); Toebelman v. Missouri-Kan. Pipeline Co., 130 F.2d 1016,
1018 (3d Cir. 1942).
120 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 272 F.2d 139, 142 (7th
Cir. 1959); Caylor v. Virden, 217 F.2d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1955); Traylor v. Black, Sivalls
& Bryson, Inc., 189 F.2d 213, 216 (8th Cir. 1951); Dewey v. Clark, 180 F.2d 766, 772 (D.C.
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"quite clear"'' or the absence of fact issues be "perfectly clear."' 22 Not-
withstanding, and despite the complexity that frequently attends anti-
trust cases, the number of summary dispositions in whole or in part of
government and private antitrust claims is impressive. 23  In this light,
it has been recognized that the language used in some decisions rejecting
summary judgment tends to give an "inaccurate impression" of its
availability.'24
In this era of search for ways and means of expediting the protracted
case, the mechanism of Rule 56(d) offers another reason for extending a
warmer welcome to antitrust summary judgment motions. This Rule
applies to those situations where the action is not fully adjudicated upon
summary judgment motion and a trial is necessary. Notwithstanding
such circumstances, it provides that the court, at the hearing of the mo-
tion, "shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good
faith controverted." The order shall then specify the facts that appear
without substantial controversy; these shall be deemed established at the
trial. To follow this procedure is to accomplish one of the major objec-
tives of the pre-trial conference. 2 5 Indeed, a Rule 56(d) order has a
Cir. 1950) ; But see Riedel v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 272 F.2d 901, 905 (8th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960); cf. Estepp v. Norfolk & W. Ry.' Co., 192 F.2d 889, 893 (6th
Cir. 1951); Begnaud v. White, 170 F.2d 323, 327 (6th Cir. 1948).
121 Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944); Chappell v. Goltsman,
186 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1,950); American Ins. Co. v. Gentile Bros. Co., 109 F.2d 732,
735 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 633 (1940).
122 Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950).
123 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); United States
v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 635 (1953); United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
340 U.S. 76, 86 (1950); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 1960 Trade Cases, ff 69,845 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 29 U.S.L. W. 3276
(U.S. March 20, 1961); Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 525 (2d
Cir. 1956); Enich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 229 F.2d 714, 721 (7th Cir.
1956); Peller v. International Boxing Club, Inc., 227 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1955); Feldman v.
Miller, 220 F.2d 826, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Marion County Coop. Ass'n v. Carnation Co.,
214 F.2d 557, 562 (8th Cir. 1954); Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol., 185 F.2d
196, 205 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951); Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 583 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945) ; Brunk
and Brown v. General Elec. Co., Civ. No. P-2390, S.D. Ill., March 13, 1961; Simpson v.
Union Oil Co., 1961 Trade Cases, fl 69,936 (N.D. Cal. 1960); Alexander v. Texas Co., 165
F. Supp. 53 (W.D. La. 1958); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. Cusick, 143 F. Supp. 452, 458
(D.N.J. 1956); United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1956);, Admiral
Theater Corp. v. Paramount, 140 F. Supp. 686, 699 (D. Nev. 1955); United States v.
Bayer Co., 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Combined Bronx Amusements v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, 132 F. Supp. 921, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp.
670, 676 (S.D. Cal. 1951); United States v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 91 F. Supp. 14, 17
(S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v. General Instrument Co., 87 F. Supp. 157, 190 (D.N.J.
1949); Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Wis. 1942) ; appeal
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942); Pastor v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 76 F. Supp. 781, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
124 Baron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1231 (1958).
125 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(1), (3); See Griffeth v. Utah Power and Light Co., 226 F.2d 661,
670 (9th Cir. 1955).
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status akin to a pre-trial order under Rule 16.126
This is not to suggest that motions can be brought under Rule 56 Which
merely seek either partial summary judgment of a single, indivisible
claim127 or a delineation of the controverted and uncontroverted fact
issues." Rather, for those cases where a motion for summary judgment
of the entire claim is unsuccessful, there can be useful salvage if the
Rule 56(d) procedure is conscientiously employed. 2 9 To this end, local
court rules may facilitate this process, such as the one recently adopted
in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York,'30 which is com-
parable to a rule in effect for some time in the Southern District of
California.131 Such rules require the movant to file a statement of the
material facts as to which he contends there is no genuine issue. The
other side must list those facts which are urged to be in controversy.
Unless so controverted, facts set forth by the movant are deemed ad-
mitted. With such statements from counsel it should be "practicable" in
most cases for the court to enter a Rule 56(d) order, narrowing the trial
issues, wherever summary judgment is not rendered upon the whole case
or for all the relief requested.
IV. CONCLUSION
The aims of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are a simpler prac-
tice, lower costs, speedier determinations and more effective justice. The
Rules contemplate that these aims are fostered by reduction in trial
"surprise." But in many antitrust cases, by reason of their factual com-
120 Coffman v. Federal Labs., Inc., 171 F.2d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
913 (1949); Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1943); Leonard
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 130 F.2d 535, 536 (7th Cir. 1942); Woods v. Mertes, 9 F.R.D.
318, 320 (D. Del. 1949); see notes of Advisory Committee on Amendments to Rules, 28
U.S.C.A. 305, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, p. 305. It is stated:
The partial summary judgment is merely a pretrial adjudication that certain issues
shall be deemed established for the trial of the case. This adjudication is more nearly
akin to the preliminary order under Rule 16, and likewise serves the purpose of speeding
up litigation by eliminating before trial matters wherein there is no genuine issue of
fact.
127 Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. 0. Henry Tent & Awning Co., 266 F.2d 200, 201' (7th
Cir. 1959); Coffman v. Federal Labs., Inc., 171 F.2d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 1948).
128 Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 22 F.R.D. 93, 94 (D.N.J. 1958).
129 Yale Transp. Corp. v. Yellow Truck & Coach Mfg. Co., 3 F.RI). 440, 441 (SI.DN.Y.
1944) ; 6 Moore, Federal Practice, 156.20[1], at '2295-6 (2d ed. 1950) ; cf. Dyal v. Union
Bag-Camp Paper Corp., 263 F.2d 387, 394 (5th Cir. 1959); Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220,
225-26 (1946). In some antitrust cases, efforts to limit fact issues have been made on sum-
mary judgment motions while in others the Rule 56(d) procedures find no mention.
Compare Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 22 F.R.D. 93, 97 (D.N.J. 1958) and
Newark Evening News Pub. Co. v. King Features Syndicate, 7 F.R.D. 645, 646 (D.NJ.
1948) with Reliable Mach. Works, Inc. v. Furtex Mach. Corp., 11 F.RI). 525, 526 (S.D.N.Y.
1951); Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 181 (S.TN.Y. 1959); and
Fred Johnson Cement Block Co. v. Wayite Co., 182 F. Supp. 914, 918 (D. Minn. 1960).
130 Gen. R. 9(g), for Southern and Eastern Districts N.Y. (effective Feb. 1, 1961).
131 S.). Cal. R. 3(d) (2).
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plexities, the reduction of "surprise" may be accomplished only at
enormous expense and after protracted proceedings.
To cope with this problem, the trend is toward recognizing a flexibility
in the existing procedural apparatus which it is hoped will lead to a better
accommodation of antitrust suits. The need is for machinery that will
yield effective issue definition to provide a background against which
discovery abuse may be detected and prevented. Over-discovery must be
curbed; access to truly pertinent data must be facilitated.
The effort to achieve these goals under existing Rules embraces a
disciplined and conscientious approach, by both counsel and the courts,
to the particular needs of each antitrust action. For counsel, there must
first be an appreciation of the interrelationship of the various pre-trial
procedures; and, second, a recognition of the urgent need to develop
early in each case a strategy that will effectively integrate and utilize
the various procedural devices for trimming the cause to its essential
issues, in order to render it manageable and capable of disposition. In
this process, counsel's ingenuity has led to arrangements that simplify
pre-trial processes and avoid some of the formalisms of the Rules. For
the courts, there must be an equally imginative approach, through pre-
trial conference or otherwise, which encourages voluntary adoption of
expeditious procedures. At the same time, courts must stand firm against
excessive, unnecessary discovery while employing equal vigor to assure
that no relevant matter is concealed.
Not every antitrust action is of such magnitude as to place a strain
upon the normal workings of the Federal Rules, nor does every "big
case" have an antitrust background. However, there is increasing recog-
nition that most antitrust cases have a potential dimension that distin-
guishes them from the preponderance of federal actions, and that justi-
fies a somewhat different treatment. True, the Federal Rules do not
prescribe special procedures for such cases. For that very reason, how-
ever, there must be continued effort to utilize the flexibility inherent in
the Rules to foster a procedural environment for the potentially pro-
tracted case in which the salutary aims of those Rules may be achieved.
